

# Reagan's Strategies and Policies:

## Ideology, Pragmatism, Loyalties, and Management Style

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Ronald Reagan remains something of a chameleon, though changing according to perspective rather than context. Some see him as incompetent, wayward, disengaged and overly influenced by Nancy Reagan. Others see him as an effective statesman because of his pragmatism, others because of an aggressive agenda dictated by his right-wing ideology.<sup>1</sup> The latter is a popular and powerfully presented view of neoconservatives who view Reagan's militarily build-up, the momentum he created for Western renewal, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as part of a long-term strategy aimed at, and which in their view achieved, victory over the Soviet Union. There are those who celebrate his revival of U.S. values and strength, and those who revile his chauvinism and his economic policies as exploitative capitalism. Others see him in terms of symbolism or as an agent in the politics of decline.<sup>2</sup>

From yet another perspective, while U.S. policies were "hard-headed" and its strategy disruptive for the Soviets, radical change came not primarily because of anything that Reagan did, but because of the longstanding structural flaws in the Soviet economy and the corrosive influence of Western ideas in an ever

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more interdependent world with permeable state borders. Seductive Western ideas began to take hold because of enhanced communications, the aggressive propaganda of the Roman Catholic Church, and the *fora* established by the Helsinki Accords.<sup>3</sup> Richard Lebow and Janice Stein even go so far as to picture Reagan as something of a benign onlooker in his second term, gradually drawn into dialogue by Gorbachev, in their opinion the key architect of the end of the Cold War.<sup>4</sup> Finally, some historians place more emphasis on a broad range of factors without discounting the significance of Reagan's willingness to negotiate and attempt to close down the Cold War. Those factors include the negotiations themselves, internal factors within the Soviet Union including its economic difficulties and the spread of Western ideas and norms, which nurtured domestic ambitions at odds with the continuation of a command economy and oppressive state policies.<sup>5</sup> Generally such scholars only attribute peripheral significance to the coercive economic policies and strategies championed by the hard right and the neo-Conservatives.

So who has got it right and what is the best way to try to make sense of Reagan's policies and strategies? Immediately responding to his 1980 victory in the U.S. presidential election, five correspondents from the *New York Times* put together a series of short essays. Writing in one of those Hedrick Smith struck a characterization that spoke of "two Reagans," which would resonate down the years and continues to engage academic attention.

One Reagan is the rhetorical right-winger who instinctively voices popular disenchantment with post-war American diplomacy, who conveys the sense that the world is a dangerous and inhospitable place and utters resentment that America has retreated in the face of Soviet advance....The other Reagan is the pragmatic practitioner of power. His statements are circumspect, his language more carefully ambiguous and qualified. If the right-wing Reagan urges a blockade of Cuba, the pragmatic Reagan shrewdly refuses to be lured into advocating American intervention in Iran.<sup>6</sup>

This characterization does not chime well with the influential views of the neo-Conservatives who see Reagan as a resolute Cold War warrior bereft of the ambiguities that so often accompany pragmatism. But ambiguity there was for much of Reagan's time in office. However, his right-wing ideology and its

interplay with his political pragmatism noted by Smith were not the only dynamics in operation. Sentiment and management style also had important impacts. Reagan had strong personal ties of affection and loyalty, most notably regarding British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, which could override set Cold War strategies. His management style in several cases also had significant consequences that impacted on strategic outcomes. Reagan liked to set policy agenda in broad brushstrokes and held to the fond hope that they would then be carried out by faithful and loyal subordinates. Unfortunately, that failed to recognize fully enough the ambitions of others and the political turf wars within Washington. All of which was widely recognized in the Tower Commission with its criticisms in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair of his seriously defective management style through over-delegation without proper monitoring.<sup>7</sup> The purpose of this essay is thus to interrogate how ideology, pragmatism, personal loyalties and management style all contributed to policy and strategic decisions made by Reagan and his administration and that when woven together, generally, though not always, produced effective strategies for achieving clear objectives.

### **Signposts to Reagan's Cold War Views**

Reagan thought that the Soviets had serious economic problems and that their grip on empire, particularly on Poland, was slipping. His conversations with Pope John Paul II on 7 June 1982, further exchanges with the Vatican thereafter, and the text of his 8 March 1983 “evil empire speech” all clearly indicate those convictions.<sup>8</sup> But victory over communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union were something else. There is no hint, for example, in the key NSC strategy document NSDD 75 of imminent radical change in Soviet policies, or of Soviet collapse. There is little doubt that Reagan intended to renew America, re-invigorate the Western Alliance, and challenge the Soviets more effectively, but precisely to what end and with what tactics and strategy is less easy to establish. During the 1980 election campaign he commented:

... the Soviets have been racing but with no competition. No one else is racing. And so I think that we'd get a lot farther at the table if they know that as they continue, they're faced with our industrial capacity and all that we can do.<sup>9</sup>

Reagan wanted to compete in the Cold War more vigorously, but took for granted that “the Russians, ... considered it unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike against them.”<sup>10</sup> This conviction created room for aggressive maneuvering, which involved combative rhetoric to arouse public opinion, more assertive leadership, cut-backs in technology flow to the East, and increased defense spending and technological innovations such as SDI. At the same time, the Reagan administration increased covert and counter-intelligence activities. In November 1980, Reagan’s transition team had concluded “Decisive action at the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) is the keystone to achieving a reversal of the unwise policies of the past decade.”<sup>11</sup> And soon Reagan unleashed the ex-OSS (Office of Strategic Service) operative William Casey as director of the CIA and conferred upon him an unprecedented cabinet post. Part of the justification for such robust action was the widespread concern about the impact that Soviet acquisition of Western technology would have on the strategic balance and fears of communist aggressive advances in developing countries. Largely because of the latter, Reagan decided that President Jimmy Carter’s priorities had to be reversed, especially in Latin America. In Central America—where the Reagan Doctrine would be applied most rigorously—the president saw a rising tide of communism. Human rights would have to take second place behind the need to support non-communist regimes, regardless of their human rights record. The leading advocate of this policy was Jeane Kirkpatrick, who believed that it was possible and desirable to distinguish between irredeemable communist and redeemable non-communist authoritarian regimes.

Since many traditional autocracies permit limited contestation and participation, it is not impossible that U.S. policy could effectively encourage this process of liberalization and democratization, provided that the effort is not made at a time when the incumbent government is fighting for its life against violent adversaries, and that proposed reforms are aimed at producing gradual change rather than perfect democracy overnight. To accomplish this, policymakers are needed who understand how actual democracies have actually come into being. History is a better guide than good intentions.<sup>12</sup>

From the start of his first administration, Reagan's rhetoric echoed such views and they helped to develop policy and its deployment even though it was not until February 1985 that Reagan couched such views in what became known as the Reagan Doctrine.

We must stand by our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights, which have been ours from birth.<sup>13</sup>

The designation of allies as democratic was a form of wishful future expectation so far as many regimes that the United States supported in Latin America were concerned.<sup>14</sup>

From this evidence there is little doubt that Reagan intended to do exactly what he had declared in the election campaign: provide the Soviets with a worldwide competitor. However, that has been over-emphasized by leading neo-Conservatives in an exercise of re-writing history to suggest that Reagan (who they largely abandoned support for in his second term) along with their help crafted an unremittingly combative series of policies that caused the Soviet Union to over-stretch and snap resulting in clear and unambiguous U.S. victory in the Cold War. In fact, things were more nuanced for Reagan than that. In a key early 1983 iteration of strategic policy for dealing with the Soviet Union, its main author, the leading hawk Richard Pipes, NSC director of East European and Soviet affairs, stated that the primary focus of U.S. policy should be to “contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism,” but as one scholar has so ably demonstrated Reagan was insistent that the policy should not obstruct “compromise and quiet diplomacy” with the Soviets. In addition, the policy was declared to be:

[NSDD 75] ... for the long haul ... the U.S. must demonstrate credibly that its policy is not a blueprint for an open-ended, sterile confrontation with Moscow, but a serious search for a stable and constructive long-term basis for U.S.–Soviet relations.<sup>15</sup>

NSDD 75, clearly aimed at changing the Soviet Union, but it articulated little that was different from the position of previous administrations. In fact, rather oddly in many ways, it spoke of establishing better long-term relations and of carrots and sticks to modify Soviet policy in a way that echoed the linkage policy of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger from the much-reviled years of *détente*. Contrary to scholars and political pundits who later trumpeted the carefully crafted triumph of the United States in the Cold War, NSDD 75 does not seem to meet even the criteria for prevailing over, never mind defeating, the Soviets.<sup>16</sup> This is something of a signpost that Reagan's grand strategy was more flexible and pragmatic than was often realized at the time, and subsequently.

### **Ideology, Pragmatism and Management Style**

One of the key issues for the hardline ideologues within the Reagan administration was technology transfer to the Soviet Union and their desire to wage all-out economic warfare. In 1981 new levels of paranoia arose with the revelations of the Soviet Line X Operation, designed to steal Western technology. Even before this, Reagan had wanted to cut down on the technology flow to the East, though not to the same extent as his more ideologically committed colleagues, or at too great a cost to his domestic electorate, the unity of the Western Alliance or his aim of drawing the Soviets into productive negotiations. This looked remarkably like the reincarnation of the Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower administrations' convictions about the importance of allies and the adage of only negotiating from a position of strength. Not surprisingly these complex aims again elicited ambiguity from Reagan.

Reagan lifted the grain embargo against the USSR [imposed by Carter in retaliation for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan] without denying the principle of economic sanctions, which was invoked in the case of Poland less than nine months later. He denounced arms control, but in less than a year his administration was involved in negotiations. He denounced SALT 2 as fatally flawed but lived up to its provisions for five years. He attacked the Helsinki conference but continued to participate fully in the follow-on meetings at Madrid, Stockholm and Vienna.<sup>17</sup>

Whether or not Reagan opposed East-West trade on ideological “moral, economic and strategic grounds” is at least debatable given his lifting of the grain embargo in April 1981 and other measures, which he later approved, but it is clear that he appointed people to low, middle and high ranking positions who held such views. These included Gus W. Weiss and Norman A. Bailey on the National Security Council (NSC) staff, Richard Perle as assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, Richard Pipes as the main Soviet specialist in the early years of Reagan’s first administration on the NSC, Lawrence Brady, the assistant secretary of commerce for export administration, William P. Clark, national security adviser, William Casey, director of the CIA, and Caspar Weinberger, secretary of defense.<sup>18</sup>

At the outset of his presidency, the use of economic sanctions was prioritized because Reagan and Weinberger thought that the United States would not send effective deterrent messages if they relied solely on U.S. military capabilities.<sup>19</sup> In 1982 Reagan thought curtailing Western credits would confront the Soviets with a stark choice of currying favor with the West or starving. This message was also broadcast by his national security adviser, William Clark, who told an audience at Georgetown University in May 1982: “We must force our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings.”<sup>20</sup> In 1983 Reagan told Margaret Thatcher that: “The task was to convince Moscow that the only way it could remain equal was by negotiations because they could not afford to compete in weaponry for very much longer.” And after Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary in April 1985, Reagan became convinced that if he waited long enough the Soviets would accept deep arms cuts because of the parlous state of the Soviet economy, even though the United States would proceed with SDI.<sup>21</sup> Several scholars have talked of a strategy of all-out cold economic warfare and of its deployment during 1981-85.<sup>22</sup> Key figures, including Weinberger, Casey, Perle, Pipes, and Brady all had such intentions with the objective of causing the collapse of, or regime change in, the Soviet Union. However, this is incompatible with early signposts to Reagan’s thinking, with his accommodating line after 1984, with the actual text of NSDD 75, and with his willingness to negotiate from a position of economic and military strength. Reagan’s intent was different: while they wanted to collapse the Soviet Union, he wanted to draw it into talks about long-term co-existence with a more gradual change in Soviet policies and a reduction in the danger from nuclear weapons. When the most aggressive U.S. embargo policy

was applied it was largely because of the hardliners taking advantage of Reagan's management style. Actions looked to be in step, but intent was always different.

For all its bold rhetoric, the Reagan administration took time to determine its way ahead in the Cold War and in the sphere of economic denial policies in particular. However, revelations of the Line X Operation, along with Soviet pressure on Poland and the declaration of martial law in December 1981, provided fuel for the hard-liners and new opportunities for pursuing their objectives.

The intentions of Richard Perle were abundantly clear before the Polish crisis erupted. In November, he stated: "The assessment of the Department of Defense and of the Reagan Administration is that this highly coordinated Soviet effort [to match Western technology] is being carried out at the expense of the free world by a raid on our technology ... from precision tools to process know-how technology." In May 1982, Weinberger went even further: "Selling them our valuable technology upon which we have historically based much of our security is short-sightedness raised to the level of a crime."<sup>24</sup>

For this group of advisers there were two fundamental justifications for all-out cold economic warfare: the denial of high technology, and to increase stress within the Soviet system to the point where it would snap. With the Polish crisis they thought their opportunity to increase such pressures had arrived. When the Polish government declared martial law it took Washington by surprise, and it was several days before Reagan responded. Part of the problem was that there was no overt Soviet intervention. The United States and its allies had not prepared a collective response for this eventuality.<sup>25</sup> However, intelligence reports placed beyond doubt, in the collective mind of the Reagan administration, Soviet involvement and responsibility for martial law.<sup>26</sup> Reagan wrote to his soul mate Margaret Thatcher of his outrage at the Soviet role in Poland.<sup>27</sup> On 29 December, he announced a range of trade sanctions. His declared intention was "to convey to those regimes, how strongly we feel about their joint attempts to extinguish liberty in Poland."<sup>28</sup>

Reagan's reasons for imposing sanctions on Poland overlapped with those of his hardline Defense Department and NSC team, but he had others as well. Reagan was determined to send a strong message of condemnation in order to redeem the threats he had uttered to try to deter Soviet involvement in the repression of the Polish reform movement and to try to deter them from further aggressive moves. There would also have been little chance of gaining allied support for a more combative stance against communism if he had not taken punitive action. Export-Import Bank of the United States credit guarantees

were stopped, Polish fishing and airline rights in areas of U.S. jurisdiction were suspended, and the president requested the allies to restrict high-technology exports. On 29 December, similar sanctions were imposed on the Soviet Union, most notably including the suspension of talks for a new long-term grain agreement and an embargo on equipment for the Urengoi oil pipeline. However, these measures did not meet with the full approval of either the ideological hardliners in the administration, who wanted and continued to push for more punitive measures, or the allies who would only muster feeble retaliatory measures against the Soviets and verbal condemnation at the NATO Council on 11 January. The polarization of views is well illustrated by Weinberger's desire to declare Poland in default on its debt repayments and the expression of horror at such a prospect by Prime Minister Thatcher, who, by no-one's account, could be considered to be soft on communism.<sup>29</sup> It became obvious on 23 January that there would be a real problem between the United States and its allies when the French signed a major pipeline contract with the Soviets: others soon followed.

Both Mastanduno and Jentleson convincingly argue that the Polish sanctions issue was hijacked by the hardliners in Washington. And that hijacking was facilitated at least in part because of Reagan's management style to delegate authority. The bureaucratic infighting was notorious and a cause of serious embarrassment at home and at international gatherings. "At worst, what Richard Perle called Reagan's extreme 'intellectual delegation of authority' invited either bureaucratic chaos, or the pushing of policy far into the regions of unaccountability."<sup>30</sup> On at least two occasions, this chaos favored the hardline ideologues who sought to push policy further into the realms of all-out cold economic warfare with the Soviets, but as Secretary of State George Shultz observed: "No decision could ever be regarded as final or implemented with confidence as policy."<sup>31</sup> In the end, opportunism, afforded by temporary advantage gained in the Washington bureaucratic struggle, did not produce a coherent policy for the hardliners. The squeeze policy was never clearly established, among other reasons because Reagan did not consistently apply it.<sup>32</sup>

Martial law in Poland may have been the "proximate," but it was neither the only nor the "most significant cause" for one of the key sanctions, the prohibition of technology for the Urengoi oil pipeline. It all became part of "the broader attempt to retard the Soviet economy over the long run."<sup>33</sup> Indeed, the principal "architect of the pipeline sanctions was Richard Perle, who obtained the full backing of Weinberger. It was a characteristic Perle move, an example of swift lateral thinking that took his adversaries by surprise."<sup>34</sup> His statement

“indicated that American coercive objectives ran much deeper than the symbolic and compellence objectives associated with the issue of martial law in Poland.” It was, Jentleson suggests, part of an “overarching strategy” to return to the economic coercion of the 1950s.<sup>35</sup> Perle and his allies seized the unexpected turn of events in the Polish crisis as an opportunity to push their agenda of waging all-out cold economic warfare against the Soviets. The hardliners, such as CIA Director Casey, who by late 1981 was Reagan’s key adviser on Poland, had much in-put into the decision to sanction Poland and the Soviet Union. These officials had no faith in linkage. They believed that the way forward was to cow the Soviets into submission by forging ahead with high-technology upgrades of U.S. armaments, by economically and psychologically damaging the Soviets with a comprehensive and multilaterally applied embargo policy, and by demonstrating that they could not economically meet the challenge posed by the U.S. military build-up.

According to Haig, the ideological hardliners pushed things to the extent of over-reaching their authority: “when the decision [to sanction] was applied by the Department of Commerce, one of its officials, going beyond the letter of intent of the President’s policy, interpreted it as being retroactive.” “I doubt that this was the President’s intent ... , certainly this issue never won support in discussion around the NSC table.” “Inexplicably, the Administration accepted this bureaucratic fiat.”<sup>36</sup> What this meant was that European allies would be required to break contracts already concluded with the Soviets and U.S. subsidiaries in Europe and European companies that relied on US technology would be subject to U.S. sanctions if they did not abide by the new U.S. export restrictions. All Haig could do, with the help of Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, Secretary of Commerce Baldrige, and U.S. Trade Representative William Brock, was to delay implementation while Under Secretary of State James Buckley went to canvass European opinion. Reagan was willing to risk allied “estrangement” over sanctions, but the response of the allies went further than that and was one of indignant fury.

Even Reagan’s closest ally Thatcher stood out against American calls for extending the Western embargo. When Haig visited Downing Street on 29 January 1982, Thatcher ridiculed the idea of calling in Polish debts because of the chaos that would cause to Western banking. She bluntly told Haig, and subsequently Reagan by letter, that there was no possibility of West Germany or France (and by implication, Britain) giving up their pipeline contracts with the Soviets.<sup>37</sup> Six months later in June 1982, Thatcher, on one of her numerous

visits to Washington, continuously harangued the president and his advisers about the extraterritorial application of U.S. sanctions against recalcitrant allies in the pipeline crisis.<sup>38</sup> Thatcher publicly condemned U.S. policy and Britain along with other countries and the EC denounced the action as illegal and took steps to require their national companies to fulfill their legally binding contractual obligations. This created the very scenario that Haig (and Thatcher) had so dreaded, particularly as Pershing II and cruise missile European deployment was only months away.

As the Europeans were refusing to cooperate with such determination, it became clear to most rational people that cold economic warfare was simply not going to happen in reality, though that did not stop the ideologically committed from advocating and trying to develop such a policy. Shultz's comments about William Casey are apt here: "But his views were so strong and so ideological that they inevitably colored his selection and assessment of materials."<sup>39</sup> Reagan's were not.

The tactical victories of the ideological hardliners were short-lived. When Haig resigned on 25 June, he was replaced by George Shultz who was a much more effective operator and someone who was on record as a critic of what he called 'light-switch diplomacy', or turning on and off trade flows.<sup>40</sup> He soon made it a priority to end sanctions. Reagan also had a rather different position to Weinberger, Perle *et al.* He was in the business of sending messages. If high technology denials slowed down the Soviets' military programs or hurt them economically then these things were also desirable, but primarily he wanted to pressure the Soviets into negotiations. He did not seek the collapse of, or uncontrollable turmoil in, the Soviet Union. It was on these objectives that he parted company with the hardliners in his entourage. In short, different factions in the administration had different reasons for wanting to see sanctions imposed. And, as a strategy pursued by the ideological hardliners, it amounted, in the end, to wishful thinking because they could not carry either key figures within the Reagan administration with them, nor U.S. allies.

Weinberger, Perle, Clark, Casey, and Brady now discovered that Shultz was just as able to out-manuever them as they had his predecessor. The result was a more moderate line on economic controls in conjunction with European allies who agreed: "not to engage in trade agreements that "contribute to the military or strategic advantage of the USSR...."<sup>41</sup>

Reagan was in fact just as concerned to use coercive economic statecraft to convey messages as to inflict damage or stretch the Soviet Union and was

thus far more prepared to adapt policy pragmatically to compromise with allies who had different views about waging the Cold War than the hardliners in his administration. He never intended to destroy the Soviet Union through a dramatic victory. Instead, he aimed to draw the Kremlin into a negotiated settlement that would benefit the United States, de-escalate the arms race and prepare the ground for long-term and gradual change in the Soviet Union. Interestingly, during 1985 the last of the hardliners departed the administration. Long before then Reagan had begun to prepare the ground for talks with the Soviets: something that was anathema to the hardline neoconservatives. In 1983 the Soviet specialist Jack F. Matlock was brought into the NSC to craft a negotiating strategy for dealing with the Soviets and to end the arms race. He became a key figure in Reagan's development of Cold War strategy and directly oversaw the fruits of much of his own planning after becoming U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1987. By 1985 this forward planning had already begun to pay off with Reagan pushing forward vigorously for negotiations and radical disarmament with Gorbachev.<sup>42</sup>

### **Personal Loyalties, Pragmatism and Management Style**

I couldn't be happier than I am over England's [sic] new prime minister ... I've been rooting for her to become prime minister since our first meeting.<sup>43</sup>

Before either of them came to their respective pinnacle of power they had met in London. The meeting was scheduled for a few minutes: it lasted for two hours and Reagan commented that "it was evident from our first words that we were soul mates when it came to reducing government and expanding economic freedom."<sup>44</sup> Eighteen months later Reagan was elected president of the United States and one of the closest and most important heads of state friendships was immediately in the making. Their affection for each other is indisputable. One author who interviewed many of Reagan's close colleagues in government later wrote: "It is impossible to speak for long to many of Reagan's associates without realizing just how important the Thatcher friendship was to him and how it had developed over their years in power."<sup>45</sup> For her part Thatcher always spoke with obvious affection of Reagan and was also aware of being soul mates:

“... I regarded it as my duty to do everything I could to reinforce and further President Reagan’s bold strategy to win the Cold War, which the West has been slowly losing. ... I was perhaps his principal cheerleader in NATO.”<sup>46</sup> And at their meeting in Washington in February 1981 speaking from the White House lawn she said: “... we in Britain stand with you.... Your problems will be our problems, and when you look for friends, we will be there.”<sup>47</sup> As indisputable as their close friendship was their anti-communism, but even from these starting points their policies often diverged because of the intrusion of specific national priorities and this was repeatedly the case in the Western Hemisphere.

One of the most fraught areas of the world for Reagan was the Americas and the development of the Reagan Doctrine was significantly influenced by his determination to counter communist and especially Cuban communist threats to that region. The result was dalliance with a string of authoritarian regimes, which received economic and military assistance in various forms from the United States. This was justified, often in the face of overwhelming evidence of human rights abuses and rank corruption, by the line of argument most notably disseminated by Jeane Kirkpatrick. Reagan appointed her as U.S. ambassador to the UN, thus sending a clear message that President Carter’s priority regarding human rights had been abandoned. Soon Reagan was consorting with military dictators and one of his first guests in the White House after becoming president was the distinctly unsavory General Roberto Eduardo Viola of Argentina.<sup>48</sup> In contrast, while Thatcher could never be described as being soft on Communism, she did not go along fully with Reagan’s view about the threat from Cuba and communist subversion in Latin America. As she noted on the eve of her first visit to see Reagan in February 1981: “There was still some difference of view about whether the threat was as serious as the US claimed.”<sup>49</sup> These differing perspectives caused some difficulties in their relations. The most notorious were over the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983, but there were also tensions over Belize, its ambitions for independence from Britain and its long-standing dispute with Guatemala. Most significantly, from the perspective of this study, Reagan overrode immediate Cold War American priorities during the Falklands War and departed from the well-established line of Jeane Kirkpatrick to support his friend Margaret Thatcher. Before taking a closer view at the Falklands, the difficulties over Belize and Grenada will be briefly visited as they help to fill out some of the context of U.S.-UK and Reagan-Thatcher relations in Latin America.

Belize was a long-standing thorn in the side of British diplomacy because of territorial claims on it from Guatemala. The situation became fraught with the prospect of independence for Belize because as a tiny state with few resources and a small population it would be vulnerable to pressure or invasion from the more powerful Guatemala. The onus on Britain therefore was to try to ensure the long-term security of Belize so that independence could be consummated and the British taxpayer relieved of the costs of running and protecting the colony. Serious thought and consideration were given in London from 1979 onwards regarding independence for Belize, but the Americans were concerned that it might bring with it uncertainty that could be exploited by Cuban infiltration. This led to tangled priorities in Washington and London.

Unfortunately, in the 1980s Guatemala was governed by a succession of right wing authoritarians with abysmal human rights records: Lucas Garcia; Ríos Montt; and Óscar Humberto Mejía Victores. However, the Reagan administration engaged with Guatemala as one of its several bulwarks against the seepage of communism across the region. That meant economic and military support. But U.S. hardware, as the British well knew, could be used just as easily against Belize as against Cuban communists. The result of this configuration of priorities was a seemingly endless round of negotiations between the British and the Americans, the Belize and Guatemalan governments. The British desperately wanted to off-load the financial costs of Belize, but accepted continuing responsibility for its security after its independence in September 1981. That meant maintaining a costly British military presence there, something the United States strongly urged the British to do for the sake of stability and countering communism. They even went so far as to support Britain's military presence financially in Belize, whilst ironically exacerbating the security situation there by supporting the Guatemalan military. The United States played an active intermediary role, but was unable to square the circle of incompatible objectives. British forces with some American assistance continued as a presence in Belize until 1994 and thereafter, until 2010, British forces were rotated through Belize for jungle warfare training. Commitments to keep a British military presence there were reiterated from time to time and most significantly in 1982 at the time of the Falklands War when Thatcher looked to gain some *quid pro quo* support from the Americans for the British Expeditionary Force, which eventually re-took the Falklands, for helping to keep stability in Belize.

In the great scope of things, no one in London or the United States thought that Belize was a really important issue, but it is interesting to note how Amer-

ican Cold War policy had to adapt to accommodate the priorities of its close ally and moderate its support for Guatemala. In these situations, grand strategy of the Reagan administration was much characterized by practical pragmatism, partly at least in deference to its close friend and ally Great Britain. One cannot say that the recipe was the same for dealing with Grenada.

Grenada was the closest the Reagan-Thatcher special relationship came to a car crash. The Americans had three issues with Grenada. First, the problems that erupted in Grenada came literally hours after the massacre at the marine barracks in Beirut where over 250 U.S. military personnel, mainly marines, were massacred by terrorist truck bombs. That posed serious political problems for the Administration and emphasized the need to protect U.S. personnel abroad and that concern was relevant to Grenada where there were about 600 U.S. students and teachers. Secondly, the left-wing government on Grenada was consorting with Cuba and there was a substantial Cuban presence on the island. And thirdly an extension to the main airstrip in Grenada was underway enabling the largest of the Soviet Union's aircraft to land there, which was seen as a potential danger for key lines of logistical support from the U.S. gulf coast to Europe in the event of a crisis there. These considerations energized Secretary of State George Shultz to push for a military operation to overthrow the regime on Grenada, expel the Cubans and secure the lives of American citizens on the island.

A combination of the need to combat the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere, securing American citizens and a response to lay to rest the concerns that had arisen because of the tragedy in Beirut drove strategic decision-making along at a helter-skelter pace. The operation was successful, but Britain's pride was seriously damaged because Grenada was a member of the Commonwealth and Thatcher was only told at the very last minute that the invasion would take place, and it went ahead even though she argued strongly against it. Even worse, the British had been inadvertently misled and Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe had only hours before the invasion assured the House of Commons that it was not going to happen. The aftermath of all this for a while was poisonous.

When Thatcher rang him after hearing of the invasion, Reagan later recalled: "As soon as I heard her voice, I knew she was angry." That was putting it mildly. Thatcher was soon to say on the BBC World Service: "We in the Western countries, the Western democracies use our force to defend our way of life. We do not use it to walk into other people's countries, independent sovereign

territories.”<sup>50</sup> Cold War priorities might justify military intervention in another state so far as Reagan was concerned, but they did not for Thatcher. She was highly skeptical of the legal justifications put forward, namely requests for help from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and from Governor General of Grenada Sir Paul Scoon and later research indicates that Thatcher was right to be so.<sup>51</sup>

So what went wrong? A significant part of the problem was again Reagan’s style of management. His aides knew that he liked to keep Thatcher informed of U.S. decisions, particularly those which would bear on UK interests, but on this occasion they failed to prompt him to inform her ahead of time. For others in the administration and especially Shultz the priority was swift action partly to secure U.S. citizens but also to implement Cold War priorities and on this occasion they ran contrary to Britain’s. However, both sides quickly recognized the threat to their special relationship and took measures to repair matters. To some extent, that was done by recognition in Washington that they had not handled things well and had unintentionally misled the British, hence Howe’s embarrassment in the Commons. Reagan rang Thatcher in the midst of the crisis as U.S. troops were trying to stabilize the situation on Grenada and roundly apologized for causing her embarrassment. He started the conversation by saying: “If I were there, Margaret, I’d throw my hat in the door before I came in.” In this remarkable unscripted conversation Reagan apologized several times and explained that part of the problem was information sensitivity: he had feared the possibility of leaks at the Washington end that could have compromised the military operation if he had spoken to Thatcher about details on the telephone. Reagan, it would seem, was determined to mend fences without delay. Thatcher, while clearly frosty during the telephone exchange, was also gracious enough to accept his line of justification fulsomely: “I know about sensitivity” she said “because of the Falklands. That’s why I would not speak for very long even on the secret telephone to you. Because even that can be broken. I’m very much aware of sensitivities. The action is under way now and we just hope it will be successful.”<sup>52</sup> And the bottom line for Thatcher, notwithstanding her intense anger, was always: “Britain’s friendship with the United States must on no account be jeopardized.”<sup>53</sup> And in 1986 she more than lived up to that principle when she ordered support for the U.S. retaliatory air strike on Gaddafi’s Libya. Once Reagan explained the details of the proposed U.S. air strike to her, from that point on her “efforts were directed not at trying to hold America back but to giving her Britain’s full support.” She repeatedly said to her colleagues: “This

was something we just have to do.”<sup>54</sup> And as friendship influenced Thatcher’s strategic decisions, so it was with Reagan and nowhere more clearly than during the Falklands War.

Reagan explained in his memoirs:

The depth of this special relationship made it impossible for us to remain neutral during Britain’s war with Argentina over the Falkland Islands in 1982, although it was a conflict in which I had to walk a fine line.<sup>55</sup>

When Argentina illegally seized the Falklands by military force on the pretext that they were the Argentine Malvinas Islands, walking a fine line was indeed necessary. Reagan had overturned President Carter’s strategic priorities in Latin America and instead of pressing for human rights issues the President had followed the line of argument from Jeane Kirkpatrick to consort with right-wing authoritarian regimes in order to counter the communist threat. One of those regimes was General Galtieri’s in Argentina. There were also resonances that arose from the Falklands crisis that echoed around the Americas concerning British latter day imperialism and interference in the Western Hemisphere by a European power contrary to the strictures of the Monroe Doctrine. Reagan seemingly confronted an impossible situation, far worse than regarding Belize where Cold War priorities had run counter to British interests and even worse than what occurred later on in Grenada. However, in the Falklands case Reagan acted decisively cutting to what he saw as the quick of the matter and overrode U.S. immediate Cold War priorities. He was prepared to discount the adverse repercussions that would inevitably arise among members of the Organization of American States at Britain’s military counter-intervention because of affection for Thatcher, loyalty to the Anglo-American special relationship and the rule of international law. One could also argue that longer-term and broader Cold War considerations also played a part in the decision to help Britain because the UK was its closest Cold War ally and Thatcher was Reagan’s “cheerleader” in NATO and there were important developments pending in Europe, notably the deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles. To what extent these considerations operated is debatable, but the bottom line was that it was inconceivable that the UK would have broken the Cold War alliance with the United States over the Falklands and from this perspective the Reagan-Thatcher friendship and loyalty

to the special relationship would appear to be the controlling dynamics. However, Reagan's management style also contributed to the way events developed.

In his memoirs, Reagan asserted that up until the outbreak of hostilities, the United States was neutral. In the meantime, Secretary of State Haig conducted an intense shuttle diplomacy in an attempt to resolve the crisis peacefully. Much of this angered Thatcher who refused to accept any room for compromise other than the full withdrawal of Argentine troops: aggression by authoritarian regimes could not be tolerated or rewarded in any way. But while Haig practiced his diplomacy, Caspar Weinberger, Reagan's anglophile defense secretary, quietly set in motion logistical supply and intelligence support for the British. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman explained what happened after the event as follows:

One has to understand the relationship of the United States Navy to the Royal Navy—there's no other relationship, I think, like it in the world between two military services....

There was no need to establish a new relationship ... it was really just turning up the volume ... almost a case of not being told to stop rather than crossing a threshold to start.<sup>56</sup>

In other words, the United States was already covertly supporting the British while Haig's attempts at peaceful reconciliation were ongoing, though it is doubtful that the President was fully aware of what the Pentagon was doing. Neutral America was not. Once hostilities began, its support became unambiguous and public knowledge and Reagan confirmed that we "provided her [the UK] with whatever aid we could."<sup>57</sup> Those decisions ultimately rested with Reagan because Kirkpatrick and Weinberger were almost always at odds with each other, Kirkpatrick strongly opposed to alienating Latin America by helping the UK and Weinberger determined, like the president, that whatever help was needed had to be rendered to the UK.<sup>58</sup> But even after it was all over and the Falklands liberated, Reagan felt obliged to raise with Thatcher the desirability of some concessions and compromise, otherwise he, and certainly Kirkpatrick, feared that Galtieri would fall from power and Argentina might descend into chaos. This in itself indicates just how important U.S. Cold War priorities in

Latin America were and yet Reagan had seen fit to override them for the sake of his close friend and the special relationship. And those considerations were once again to prevail. When Thatcher explained that it was impossible to concede anything to the Argentines after such British expenditure of blood and treasure Reagan noted: "... she convinced me. I understood what she meant."<sup>59</sup>

## Conclusion

The United States is rarely if ever a unitary decision-maker; a unitary executive force does not propel government. The system itself is complex and actors operating within it change positions over time, key personnel come and go, and circumstances alter and all this is exacerbated when someone as difficult to read in policy and strategic decision-making as Ronald Reagan is president.

Unlike his more ideological colleagues, Reagan was more pragmatic and never intended or expected to destroy the Soviet Union: but he was steadfast in his opinion that America's strength had to be renewed and that negotiations with the Soviets had to be conducted to reach a more stable relationship and one that would reduce the dangers from nuclear weapons and provide a context in which change could occur from within the Soviet Union. Despite all the violent criticisms of *détente*, in the end, Reagan practiced something similar himself, albeit with a great deal of helpful cooperation from Mikhail Gorbachev.<sup>60</sup> And he did so with great courage and resolve refusing to concede to the Realist calculations of Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon and Brent Scowcroft, the caution of his State Department, and the worries of the Pentagon. Instead he established a relationship of trust with Mikhail Gorbachev and had faith in the ideas and economics of the West and drove forward the closing down of the Cold War.<sup>61</sup> Ideology and pragmatism were richly intermingled in Reagan's make-up and that is evident in his Cold War grand strategy.

But, such grand strategy also often gave way or was modified, albeit temporarily, by Reagan's sense of loyalty to and affection for Margaret Thatcher and the Anglo-American special relationship. This was most evidently so during the Falklands War when immediate Cold War priorities were overridden. Realists might respond and say Reagan's policies had nothing to do with sentiment, but were purely calculated in terms of long-term Cold War strategic priorities dictated by Britain's important role in NATO and Europe, but the evidence presented here suggests that such arguments tend towards sophism.

Finally, Reagan's management style is the fourth key dynamic for understanding Reagan's policy and strategic decision-making. Evidence for this emerges from the early stages of the Falklands crisis before hostilities commenced, from the hijacking of economic coercion policies by the neo-Conservatives in the aftermath of the imposition of military law in Poland and from the Grenada crisis where poor communications with the British made a difficult situation in Anglo-American relations dire for a short period.

Reagan still remains a slightly elusive character as president and yet viewing him through the lenses of ideology and pragmatism, personal loyalties and management style provides a corrective to the skewed accounts of the ideologically charged neo-Conservatives and to tendencies to over-simplify Reagan the man. Reagan was not incompetent, though he was not without failings. The way he related to Thatcher and more importantly to Gorbachev is testimony to his diplomatic skills and clear perspective. Neither was he blinded by ideological commitment nor simply driven by pragmatism: negotiating agreements with Gorbachev and treading the fine line in the Falklands demonstrate these contentions. And while he was clearly often unfocused on management, he could control and drive things forward when he had a mind to. So Reagan emerges here as more complex than is often acknowledged and more importantly sensitive to the complexities of the geo-political environment in which he had to operate. Seen in this light it becomes apparent why the lenses of ideology, pragmatism, personal loyalty and management style all demand attention and when accorded such help to dispel the opacity that so often in the past has made it difficult to read accurately the strategic and policy decision-making of the Reagan Administration.

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## Notes

1. Robert Dallek, *Ronald Reagan: the Politics of Symbolism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Joel Krieger, *Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of De-*

*cline* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986); Geoffrey Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher* (London: The Bodley Head, 1990); Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: the Role of a Lifetime* (New York: Public Affairs, 1991); “President Reagan, who may have had cynical advisers was not cynical himself . . . took the principle of ‘negotiation from strength’ literally: once one had built strength, one negotiated.” From John L. Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 125.

2. Peter Schweizer, *Reagan’s War: The Epic Story of His Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism* (New York: Random House, 2002); Derek Leebaert, *The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America’s Cold War Victory* (Boston, Little Brown, 2002). Members of the Reagan administration who have written in a similar vein include Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon* (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 1990); Robert Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Inside Story of Five Presidents and How they Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon Schuster, 1996); Richard Pipes, “Misinterpreting the Cold War,” *Foreign Affairs*, 74 (1995): 154-161; Gus W. Weiss, *The Farewell Dossier: Strategic Deception and Economic Warfare in the Cold War—An Insider’s Untold Story* (The American Tradecraft Society); and Norman A. Bailey, *The Strategic Plan that Won the Cold War* (McLean, Virginia: The Potomac Foundation, 1999). The idea that the U.S. military build-up was a major factor that led to the demise of the Cold War and Western “victory” is rejected by Russian insider experts such as Georgi Arbatov, *The Soviet System: An Insider’s Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Times Books, 1992), and by scholars such as Frederich Kratchowil, in his scathing attack on neo-realism, “The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-realism as the Science of Realpolitik Without Politics,” *Review of International Studies* 19 (1993): 63-80. Beth A. Fisher, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000) raises substantial doubts about cause and effect from both the U.S. arms build-up and the early Reagan administration hard-line by close scrutiny of the chronology of Soviet policy developments. A more recent, and in this author’s view, a compelling argument about Reagan’s success in pursuing a negotiated end to the Cold War with Gorbachev, contrary to the advice of many of his immediate official entourage, is James Mann, *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War* (New York: Viking Penguin, 2009). Much corroboration for the thesis that Reagan always intended to bring about a negotiated closing down, or at least a detoxed Cold War comes from Jack F. Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House, 2004). Matlock became Reagan’s key Soviet adviser in 1983.

3. R. Davy, ed., *European Détente: A Reappraisal* (London: Sage, 1992); K. Dawisha, *Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); David Ryall, “The Cross and the Bear: the Vatican’s Cold War Diplomacy in East Central Europe” and Robert Bideleux, “Soviet and Russian Perspectives on the Cold War,” in Alan P. Dobson (ed.) with S. Malik and G. Evans (ass. eds.) *Decon-*

*structing and Reconstructing the Cold War* (Andover, Md.: Ashgate, 1999). A closely associated approach emphasises the importance of the beliefs of Gorbachev and his associates: Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn from Cold War to a New Era* (New York, Poseidon Press, 1991); and McGeorge Bundy, "From Cold War to Trusting Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 69 (1990): 197-212.

4. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995).

5. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbot, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Little Brown, 1993); Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*. A highly persuasive argument against the Reagan Cold War victory thesis is presented by Beth A. Fisher in a paper for the *Norwegian Nobel Institute*, "Reagan's Triumph? The U.S. and the Ending of the Cold War," 16 May 2002, see also her, *The Reagan Reversal*. An interesting overview of the rather narrow "causal" accounts of the end of the Cold War are in Charles W. Kegley's, "How Did The Cold War Die? Principles for An Autopsy," *Mershon International Studies Review* 38 (1994): 11-41.

6. Hedrick Smith. "Reagan's World" in Hedrick Smith et al, *Reagan: The Man, The President* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981): 95-127, at 98.

7. *The Tower Commission Report* (New York: Bantam Books, 1987).

8. See Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (London: Harper Collins, 1995), chapter 12. In fact the Reagan record, both before and during his presidency, is replete with references to the un-sustainability of the Soviet economic system in the long-term, but one should not deduce from this that Reagan was bent on destroying the Soviet Union during his terms of office or that he expected that his policies would cause its swift collapse.

9. Hedrick Smith, *Reagan the Man*, 120-21, sources International Associated Press interview, 1 Oct. 1980.

10. Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), 588; Garthoff's judgement echoes this and even includes Reagan's more extreme colleagues: "Reagan was not disposed to take confrontational courses of action that risked a direct clash with the Soviet Union, nor were any of his principal advisers . . ." R. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1985, revised 1994), 1013. Reagan was clearly astonished when told by Robert McFarlane, his then national security adviser, that the Soviets had thought that the November 1983 NATO Able Archer exercise was the real thing and a prelude to a first strike against them, see Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher*, 123.

11. Quoted from Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 227-8.

12. Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary Magazine*, vol. 68, 5 November 1979, pp. 34-45.

13. President Reagan, State of Union Address, 6 February 1985, The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38069> retrieved 22 August 2014.

14. For a concise summary of Reagan's anti-Soviet policies see Bruce W. Jentleson, *American Foreign Policy*, 5th edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 2014), 194-212.

15. National Security Decision Directive 75 (NSDD 75), 'US Relations with the USSR', 17 January, 1983; and Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, p. 31 citing Richard Pipes, *Vixi: Memoirs of Non-Believer* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 201-2.

16. 'That's always the expression. How we prevail.' *Interview by the author with Gus W. Weiss*, Washington, D.C., 28 April 2003.

17. G. Hyland, *Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (New York: Random House, 1987), 232.

18. Steven Elliott, "The Distribution of Power and the US Politics of East-West Energy Trade Controls," in G.K. Bertsch, *Controlling East-West Trade and Technology Transfer: Power, Politics and Policy* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1988), 78. Brady had been fired by the Carter administration for publicly criticizing lax implementation of export controls: Reagan re-appointed him at a higher level, B.W. Jentleson, *Pipeline Politics: The Complex Political Economy of East-West Trade* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 175.

19. The issue here is more complex than a straightforward inventory of U.S. military power. As Hyland argues, both U.S. weakness in 1981 and strength in 1985 were over-exaggerated, but by 1985 Reagan had managed to change perceptions and most crucially of all, so far as Soviet assessments were concerned, he had set in train a trend of US military build-up. Hyland, *Mortal Rivals*, 232.

20. Quoted from Louis J. Walinsky, "Coherent Defense Strategy: The Case for Economic Denial," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter (1982/83).

21. Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, 468, citing Reagan, *An American Life*, 316, 320, Diary, 26 March 1982; Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: Harper Collins, 1993), 324; and on the wisdom of Reagan holding out at Reykjavik, 471; Reagan, *American Life*, 66, and Donald T. Regan, *For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington* (London: Hutchinson, 1988), 295-8.

22. Most notably the leading scholars in this field, M. Mastanduno, *Economic Containment: COCOM and the Politics of East-West Trade* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 233-4 and elsewhere in his various publications; Philip Hanson, "Soviet Responses to Western Trade Policies," in David A. Baldwin and Helen V. Milner (eds.), *East-West Trade and the Atlantic Alliance* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 50; Jentleson, *Pipeline Politics*, 175.

23. Both are quoted from Bertsch, *Pipeline Politics*, 17, 21, citing as sources, Perle testimony before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-Committee on International Economic Policy and Trade, 12 Nov. 1981, Weinberger speech, Foreign Policy Association, New York, 21 May 1982. Both Perle and Weinberger would have been aware of one of the more curious incidents of the extraordinary Cold War years—the revelation of the Soviet Line X Operation and the U.S. response through “Farewell.” In early summer of 1981 Marcel Chalet head of the *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* told Vice President George H. Bush about a new informant, Vladimir Vetrov, codenamed Farewell, who worked in the KGB’s scientific and technological division. Later at the Ottawa Summit, President Mitterand passed to Reagan and Haig information from Vetrov about Line X, which had been running since 1970 out of over ten centres in Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. During 1980 “a total of 3,617 ‘acquisition tasks’ had been under way, of which, 1,085 had been successfully completed in the course of the year, producing over four thousand ‘samples’ and more than twenty-five thousand technical documents.” Operation Farewell was the US response, which allowed the Soviets to steal defective technology. The greatest claim of success for this was a huge explosion in the Soviet Siberian oil pipeline in 1982, *Weiss Interview*.

24. *Weiss Interview*.

25. Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher*, 73.

26. Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only*, 466, citing Reagan, *An American Life*, 303.

27. Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, 253, the letter arrived 19 Dec. 1981.

28. *Public Papers of the President: Ronald Reagan 1981* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 1202.

29. Mastanduno, “The Management of Alliance Export Control Policy” in Bertsch, *East-West Trade*, 302-3; Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, 354-5; Haig, *Caveat: Realism Reagan and Foreign Policy* (London: Macmillan, 1984), 255.

30. John Dumbrell, *American Foreign Policy From Carter to Clinton* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1997), 59; the disagreements and feuds were not just between departments and agencies, but within them as well, for example Michael Pillsbury, acting director of the Arms Control Agency in the Department of State, Strobe Talbot, *Deadly Gambits: the Reagan Administration and the Deadlock in Nuclear Arms Control* (New York: Knopf, 1984), 45.

31. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph* (New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1993), 690.

32. Dumbrell, *Carter to Clinton*, 117; Peter Boyle, *American-Soviet Relations: From the Russian Revolution to the Fall of Communism*, London: Routledge, 1993, 207.

33. Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Western Alliance and East-West Energy Trade,” in Bertsch (ed.), *Controlling East-West Trade*, 331; Mastanduno, *Economic Containment*, 246.

34. Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher*, 73.

35. Jentleson, *Pipeline Politics*, 173.

36. Haig, *Caveat*, 254.

37. Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, 255; Haig, *Caveat*, 255-6.

38. Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher*, 100-2.

39. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 691.

40. Haig, *Caveat*, 240; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 137.

41. G.C. Hufbauer and J.S. Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1985 & 2nd ed. With Ann Elliott, 1990), 699-700, citing sources, *Congressional Quarterly*, 20 Nov. 1982, 2883; *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 1983, 28.

42. For a more fully developed thesis on these matters see Alan P. Dobson “The Reagan Administration, Economic Warfare and the Closing Down of the Cold War,” *Diplomatic History* 29 (2005): 531-556; and “From Instrumental to Expressive The Changing Goals of the U.S. Cold War Strategic Embargo,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 12:1 (Winter 2009-2010): 98-119 ; and for the broader context his *US Economic Statecraft for Survival 1933-1991: Of Embargoes, Strategic Embargoes, and Economic Warfare* (London: Routledge, 2002). Matlock argued in his book *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 75-6, that Reagan “was in favour of bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union, but his objective was to induce the Soviet leaders to negotiate reasonable agreements, not to break up the country.”

43. Quoted from R. Dugger, *On Reagan: The Man and His Presidency* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1983), 517.

44. Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*, 204.

45. Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher*, 261. Significantly the wordy sub-title to the book runs as follows: “How personal friendship and political sympathy between the British Prime Minister and the American President helped shape great events during their years in power.”

46. Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 157.

47. Quoted from Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher*, 46.

48. General Viola overthrew the democratically elected Isabel Peron in 1976. He was stripped of his rank after being found guilty in 1985 of ordering torture, kidnapping and theft in a campaign against left-wing guerrillas and their sympathizers—the so-called dirty war—during the 1976-1983 military dictatorship. See also David F.

Schmitz, *The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), chapter 6.

49. Ibid., 158.

50. Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher*, 130.

51. See work by Sally-Anne Treharne and especially her forthcoming research monograph for EUP.

52. Retrieved 25 November 2014, <http://nypost.com/2014/11/08/never-before-heard-tapes-of-reagan-and-foreign-leaders-revealed/>

53. Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, 333.

54. Ibid., 444; and Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher*, 193.

55. Reagan, *An American Life*, 357.

56. Quoted from David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart* (London: Hodder and Staughton, 1988), 314-15, source, author interview with Lehman.

57. Reagan, *An American Life*, 259.

58. Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher*, 94, drawing on author interview with deputy national security adviser, Robert MacFarlane.

59. Reagan, *An American Life*, 360.

60. Perspective is important here. This essay has focused very much on Reagan and what he did, but it is important to emphasize also the importance in closing down the Cold War that should be attributed to Gorbachev: see Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) and more specifically his “Perestroika and the End of the Cold War,” in *Cold War History* (2007), 7(i), 1-17.

61. Mann, *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 236.